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I. INTRODUCTION
In an attempt to erase Islamic-fundamentalist sentiments held by
detainees apprehended in the course of the "war on terror," the United
States government has been teaching and preaching a more moderate
version of the Qur'an and Islam to detainees in Iraq. One such deten-
tion program in Iraq has been dubbed the House of Wisdom.1 But the
wisdom of such a practice is highly suspect-both because it likely
runs afoul of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and
because it may be doing more harm than good to the American effort
to defuse Islamic-extremism and anti-American sentiment. This Arti-
cle examines the current practice of promoting the "true" meaning of
Islam in detention centers for its legal legitimacy and uses the pro-
gram as a lens to evaluate the extraterritorial reach of the Establish-
ment Clause.
Part II briefly outlines the current program that was implemented
by the Bush Administration in detention centers in Iraq and discusses
whether it is adviseable. Part III describes the contours of the Estab-
lishment Clause as it is applied within the U.S. and describes how
teaching Islam in detention centers violates the current Establish-
ment Clause tests. Part IV demonstrates how the Establishment
Clause serves as both a protection of individual liberties and a struc-
tural restraint on government action. Drawing on recent case law and
scholarship, Part V argues that the Establishment Clause-as either
a structural restraint or as a protection of individual liberty-extends
1. Walter Pincus, U.S. Working to Reshape Iraqi Detainees: Moderate Muslims En-
listed to Steer Adults and Children Away from Insurgency, THE WASHINGTON
POST, Sept. 19, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con-
tent/article/2007/09/18/AR2007091802203.html (last visited March 13, 2008).
The great irony here is that the original "House of Wisdom" was an enormous
library and translation institute in Baghdad during the Abbassid empire. It was
built in 750 AD and destroyed during the Mongol invasion of Baghdad in 1258. It
was said that the Tigris River ran black with ink for six months after the library
was ransacked and its contents dumped into the water. JOSEF W. MERI & JERE L.
BACHARACH, MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC CMLIZATION: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 451 (Routledge
2003).
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extraterritorially to these detention centers, meaning that these pro-
grams are unconstitutional. Finally, Part VI compares the Muslim re-
education program to a more government-deferential test (yet to be
adopted by the Supreme Court) that considers the U.S. government's
national security interests. The Article concludes that even under this
test, however, the religious education program violates of the Estab-
lishment Clause of the Constitution.
II. THE MUSLIM "RELIGIOUS ENLIGHTENMENT"
PROGRAM AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
On September 18, 2007, the commander of U.S. detention facilities
in Iraq at the time, Major General Douglas M. Stone, introduced the
"religious enlightenment" program for Iraqi detainees to the public. 2
The program is part of the larger effort to win the "battlefield of the
mind" and involves the U.S. military hiring "moderate" Muslim clerics
to teach detainees a "truer," less anti-American version of Islam.3 Ac-
cording to General Stone, the religious education programs are de-
signed to "bend them back to our will" and tear down the message of
"[1] et's kill the innocents" promulgated by A1-Qaeda and other extrem-
ist groups.4 The effort began as detention centers in Iraq ballooned
from 10,000 in 2006 to over 25,000 at the end of 2007, and U.S. mili-
tary analysts came to believe that these centers were becoming
"breeding grounds" for radical Islam.5 The size of the detention popu-
lation has decreased since 2007 and, according to the U.S.-Iraqi Stra-
tegic Framework Agreement, the U.S. is gradually handing over
detention responsibilities to the Iraqi government, with the goal that
the transition will be complete by 2011.6 Nevertheless, the religious
education program continues to raise relevant legal issues with impli-
cations for future American detention operations and, more broadly,
all extraterritorial engagements with religion.
While the exact details of how the program has been run are un-
known, the rough contours provide sufficient information to demon-
strate that the programs violate the Establishment Clause. The U.S.
military, either directly or through government contractors such as
Operational Support & Services, a subcontractor of Russian and East
2. Pincus, supra note 1. See Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable with Ma-
jor General Douglas Stone, USMC, Commanding General, TF-134, MNF-I De-
tainee Operations via Conference Call From Baghdad, Iraq, September 18, 2007,
FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/dodcmsshare/
BloggerAssets/2007-09/091807Stonetranscript.pdf.
3. Pincus, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Richard Tomkins, U.S. Troops Empty Detention Centers In Iraq, RADIO FREE Eu-
ROPE, July 14, 2009, available at http://www.rferl.org/content/US Troops-
EmptyDetentionCenters In Iraq/1776533.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2009).
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European Partnerships, Inc., hires "moderate" clerics to teach relig-
ious education classes to detainees.7 In total, around 160 moderate
imams have been brought in to teach the detainees. 8 According to Ma-
jor Matthew Morgan of Task Force 134, the military unit responsible
for operating detention centers in Iraq, all of the detainees set to be
released from the detention centers as of the summer of 2008 had gone
through the religious education program, indicating that the classes
are likely prerequisites to release. 9 This highlights the plainly coer-
cive, if not mandatory, nature of the program. In addition to leading
the religious discussion classes, the hired imams make recommenda-
tions to the board reviewing detainee releases on whether the de-
tainee presents an ideological threat.1o According to General Stone,
who in 2008 handed over reigns of the Iraqi camp system to Admiral
Garland Wright, the classes were the single best way to identify ex-
tremists within the camps."'
Aside from the hiring of moderate clerics, the U.S. military seems
to be engaged directly in religious interpretation and translation.
Under the direction of General Stone, the military developed a direc-
tory of radical refrains and corresponding moderate passages of text
from the Qu'ran, in order to refute detainees when they use certain
passages to support a radical interpretation of Islam.12 General
Stone's team also completed what they described as "the world's most
moderate Hadith."'13 Hadith are accounts from the life of the Prophet
Mohammed which record his actions and sayings. 14 In sum, the relig-
ious education programs involve the U.S. government hiring clerics
based on their particular religious beliefs, coercing detainees to be
taught by these clerics, and, in some instances, engaging in religious
interpretation itself.
Although the success of the religious re-enlightenment program
has been trumpeted by General Stone, his replacement Admiral
7. Andrew Woods, Good Muslim, Good Citizen, SLATE, Jan. 23, 2009, available at
http://www.slate.com/id/2194671/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2009); Andrew Woods, The
Business End, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, June 27, 2008, available at http://www.ft.
com/cms/s/2/71c42ecO-40ca-lldd-bd48-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick-check=1 (last
visited Sept. 3, 2009).
8. Singapore Scheme Helps De-Radicalise Detainees in Iraq, THE MALAYSIAN IN-
SIDER, March 22, 2009, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/index.php/world/
20956-singapore-scheme-helps-de-radicalise-detainees-in-iraq (last visited Sept.
3, 2009).
9. Woods, The Business End, supra note 7.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. VINCENT J. CORNELL, VOICES OF ISLAM: VOICES OF TRADITION 106 (2007).
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Wright, and the U.S. military, there is reason to doubt its efficacy. 15
Dr. Cheryl Benard has been leading several RAND Corporation stud-
ies on de-radicalization of violent extremists. According to Dr.
Benard, the evidence suggests that "by and large, religious instruction
is not an effective and sensible part of the U.S. program and policy
arsenal."16 Indeed, Dr. Benard continues,
[O]ur survey of the detainee population in U.S. custody in Iraq as well as our
studies of religious programs being conducted elsewhere that serve as models
(Yemen prison program, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia) indicate that religious in-
struction of this sort is at best suited only for a small subset of the target
population and even then is distinctly risky.
1 7
These are fairly weighty indictments from an organization not known
to be either a bastion of liberal thinking or a constant critic of Republi-
can administrations' military policies. These criticisms are echoed by
Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl of the University of California, Los An-
geles, who notes that by engaging in this "battlefield of the mind," the
religious education programs "will be just another powerful piece of
evidence that this is an ideological war-that this is not about the
threat of terrorism to the U.S., but about literally trying to create an
Islam that is acceptable to certain power elites in the U.S. or the
West."1 8 Instead of religious education, which runs the risk of further
radicalizing and alienating detainees who see through the effort and
of granting access to individuals who may be falsely presenting them-
selves as "moderates" while pursuing other agendas, the RAND Cor-
poration advocates
a civics education program instead, complete with units intended to foster
critical thinking and informed decision-making, in the hope of inoculating the
detainees against extremist messages whether ideological or religious, and to
support the peace-building, anti-sectarian, nation-building effort. While not a
panacea, this may divert at least some of the discontented individuals to legal
avenues of political change and constructive social engagement. 1 9
Civics education, in addition to being more effective, would also avoid
any potential violations of the Constitution. And even if the jury is
still out on whether the religious re-education program has worked
from a practical standpoint, the verdict with respect to its legal valid-
15. See Nic Robertson, Behind the Scenes: Walking Amid 2,000 al Qaeda Suspects,
CNN, April 28, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/04/28/btsc.iraq
prison/index.html (last visited April 29, 2008); 10,000 Detainees Releases This
Year, Re-internment Rate Less Than 1 Percent, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, OFFI-
CIAL WEBSITE OF MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ, Aug. 4, 2008, available at http://
www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=21624&Item
id=110 (last visited Sept. 3, 2009).
16. Email Correspondence with Cheryl Benard, Director, Initiative for Middle East-
ern Youth, RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy, RAND Corporation (De-
cember, 2008).
17. Id.
18. Woods, The Business End, supra note 7.
19. Benard, supra note 16.
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ity is in-teaching and promoting a certain interpretation of Islam to
detainees violates the current Establishment Clause tests regulating
government involvement with religion.
III. TEACHING ISLAM VIOLATES THE CURRENT
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TESTS
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states explicitly
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or of the right of people to peaceably assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."20
The first clause of this amendment is known as the Establishment
Clause. But despite its seemingly clear command that Congress shall
make no law respecting the establishment of religion, the precise lim-
its and edges of this prohibition have taken a long time and many
court battles to iron out-and several wrinkles still remain. 2 1
A. The Prohibition of Discrimination
When trying to determine whether the government is violating the
Establishment Clause, the first question is whether the government is
discriminating among or against certain religious groups. If so, then
the government action is only permissible if it satisfies the strict scru-
tiny test-that is, if the government can demonstrate that the law or
program is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.22
The principle that the Establishment Clause prohibits discrimina-
tion among religions was made clear in the 1947 Supreme Court deci-
sion in Everson v. Board of Education.23 Everson centered on whether
a New Jersey statute which provided reimbursement for bus fares in-
curred by parents sending their children to private religious schools
violated the First Amendment. In reaching its ultimate decision that
the statute did not violate the Establishment or Free Exercise clauses,
the Everson Court stated, "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the
First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government... can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 230 (2000) (Rehnquist, Ch. J.,
dissenting).
22. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1156
(2d ed. 2002). Despite the Court's prohbition on discrimination and citation to
cases where strict scrutiny is employed, no decisions in recent years have em-
ployed strict scrutiny in the Establishment Clause context, even where a law was
arguably discriminatory. That said, the strict scrutiny test has not been
overturned.
23. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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or prefer one religion over another."24 This principle of non-discrimi-
nation between religions or denominations has been reaffirmed by a
long line of Supreme Court precedent. 25 Relying on this precedent,
the Supreme Court in Larson v. Valente stated that when "presented
with a state law granting a denominational preference, our precedents
demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we apply strict scru-
tiny in adjudging its constitutionality."2 6 The questions then arise,
what is government discrimination and when is strict scrutiny met?
1. When is the Government Discriminating Among Religions?
The contours of what constitutes discrimination among religions
can be understood through an examination and comparison of the dif-
ferent laws that the courts have deemed to be discriminatory and non-
discriminatory. In Everson, the New Jersey statute was ruled non-
discriminatory because it provided reimbursement to parents who
sent their children to any type of parochial or religious school but still
provided free transportation for those who sent their children to pub-
lic schools.2 7 In Zorach v. Clauson, the Court upheld as non-discrimi-
natory a New York City program which permitted public schools to
release students to attend religious courses operated outside of the
school building because it was applicable and available to people of all
faiths (though ostensibly not available to secular individuals).28 In
Larson, the Court held that a Minnesota law was discriminatory be-
cause it exempted from the reporting requirements imposed on chari-
ties religious institutions that received more than 50 percent of their
financial support from member donations. 2 9 In Board of Education of
Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, the Court held as dis-
criminatory a state law establishing a separate school district for a
village inhabited only by Hasidic Jews.3 0 The school district was cre-
ated solely to help one religious group, the Hasids, so their children
with special needs would not have to attend a public school with non-
Hasidic children.
24. Id. at 15. See Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring the Establish-
ment Clause in Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 1291,
1305 (1996) (discussing the emphasis in Larson on equality among religions).
25. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("The First Amendment man-
dates governmental neutrality between religion and religion . . . ."); Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) ("The fullest realization of
true religious liberty requires that government . . .effect no favoritism among
sects ... and that it work deterrence of no religious belief."); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) ("The government must be neutral when it comes to
competition between sects.").
26. 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
27. 330 U.S. at 17.
28. 343 U.S. at 313-315.
29. Larson, 456 U.S. at 248-49.
30. 512 U.S. 687, 703-04 (1994).
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Based on this Supreme Court jurisprudence, the determination of
"discrimination" seems to hinge, at least in part, on whether the gov-
ernment is facially and clearly preferring one religion over another. 3 1
This is in contrast to situations where the government is, at least ar-
guably, preferring all religions over those who do not adhere to a par-
ticular religious faith at all. The laws in Larson and Kiryas were both
ruled discriminatory because they gave special treatment to certain
religious groups in relation to other religious groups. However, in Ev-
erson and Zorach, the laws were upheld even though there was a col-
orable argument that the laws gave preference to religions and
religious adherents above secular groups and non-religious individu-
als. When these precedents, particularly Larson and Kiryas, are com-
pared to what the government has been doing in foreign detention
centers, it seems rather plain that the government is discriminating
among religions through its Muslim re-indoctrination program. In-
deed, the government's stated purpose behind this program is to in-
still and imprint a more moderate version of Islam in the detainees'
heads and quash any more "radical" or conservative Islamic beliefs-
clearly giving preference to one sect or religion above another. As
General Stone describes "the many religious leaders, all imams that
we have working for us teach out of the moderate doctrine."32 General
Stone also tells how the program is not just teaching one version or
doctrine of Islam, but how the detention center personnel are actively
working to "take those arguments [of the more radical imams] and
tear them apart."3 3 Moreover, the detainees' release seems to hinge,
at least in part, on their successful completion of and adherence to the
religious curriculum. 3 4 Here, although the exact contours of the pro-
gram remain somewhat unclear, the discrimination is based solely on
ideology and belief-and as a result is even more problematic than the
type of discrimination in Larson which was based on whether a church
received more than half of its contributions from its members. The
Supreme Court found even arbitrary, non-ideology based differentia-
tions by the government problematic and discriminatory in Larson.
Given the purposes of the Establishment Clause-to prevent the pro-
motion of one religion over another and to protect freedom of belief-
this belief-based discrimination is all the more repugnant to the Es-
tablishment Clause and clearly meets the definition of discrimination.
31. But see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 n.1 (1992) (noting that the clause is no less
applicable to government acts which favor religions generally than to acts favor-
ing one religion over another).
32. Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable with Major General Douglas Stone,
supra note 2.
33. Id.
34. Woods, The Business End, supra note 7.
348 [Vol. 88:341
2009] HOUSE OF WISDOM OR A HOUSE OF CARDS? 349
2. Is Strict Scrutiny Nevertheless Met?
Even if a law discriminates among religions, it may be permissible
if it meets strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny means that the law must be
narrowly tailored or closely fitted to achieving a compelling govern-
ment interest.3 5 In Larson, the Court recognized that Minnesota had
a significant, secular interest in preventing fraudulent solicitations
for charity and assumed, for the sake of argument, that this was a
compelling interest.36 The State of Minnesota offered three reasons
why the statute in question was narrowly tailored: (1) church mem-
bers will exercise greater supervision over the organization's solicita-
tion activities when membership contributions exceed fifty percent; (2)
membership control is an adequate safeguard against abusive solicita-
tions of the public; and (3) the need for public disclosure rises in pro-
portion with the percentage of nonmember contributions. 3 7 The
Court, emphasizing that the burden was on the State to justify the
discrimination and demonstrate that the law was narrowly tailored,
found that there was no evidence to support any of the rationales of-
fered and, most importantly, even if true, the rationales failed to ad-
dress the only part of the statute being challenged-the fifty percent
member contribution requirement that discriminated against reli-
gions which were not member funded (as it was intended to do).38
Applying the strict scrutiny standard of Larson to the govern-
ment's re-education program of Islamic detainees reveals that while
the government probably does have a compelling, secular purpose for
the program, the means are hardly narrowly tailored. The govern-
ment's stated purpose for teaching a more moderate version of Islam
to detainees is to de-radicalize them and make them less hateful to-
wards America. Certainly, the government's goal of trying to engen-
der more positive feelings towards America is a compelling
government interest, a secular one, and one that has the potential to
safeguard America from future harm and enhance our national secur-
ity. That said, there are a litany of other, more narrowly tailored
means by which to engage in that effort rather than discriminating
among religions and seemingly actively engaging in the promotion of a
certain version of Islam and hiring clerics to teach this version to de-
tainees. Examples of more narrowly tailored programs include civic
education and critical thinking classes that would teach the detainees
the values of democracy, representative government, and embolden
them to think critically about what they are learning from fundamen-
talist clerics. According to the U.S. military, some of these civic educa-
tion programs are currently going on-though they appear to occur
35. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. at 228, 246-47 (1982).
36. Id. at 248.
37. Id. at 248-49.
38. Id. at 248-51.
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only as a detainee is transitioning out of the detention center.39 Nev-
ertheless, such programs are certainly capable of expansion and im-
provement. Secular civic education and critical thinking programs
would be much more narrowly tailored, would not infringe on the Es-
tablishment Clause, and, as elucidated by Dr. Benard of the RAND
Corporation, would be much more effective in achieving the govern-
ment's objectives.
B. The Lemon Test
As the Supreme Court stated in Hernandez v. Commissioner,
"[W]hen it is claimed that a denominational preference exists, the ini-
tial inquiry is whether the law facially discriminates among religions.
If no such facial preference exists, we proceed to apply the customary
three pronged Establishment Clause inquiry derived in Lemon v.
Kurtzman."4o So, in this instance, if for some reason a court was not
convinced that the government's Muslim re-education program dis-
criminates among religions, then the court would proceed by applying
the three-part Lemon test.
In Lemon, a consolidated case involving Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island statutes that provided state aid to non-public schools to offset
costs associated with the teaching of secular curriculum, the Supreme
Court held that to comply with the Establishment Clause the law in
question must (1) have a "secular legislative purpose," (2) have a prin-
cipal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and
(3) "must not foster an excessive government entanglement with relig-
ion."4 1 If the law fails to satisfy any one of these three parts, then it
violates the Establishment Clause.42
1. Is there a Secular Legislative Purpose?
The first requirement under the Lemon test is that the law must
have a secular legislative purpose. Based on a survey of Supreme
Court decisions dealing with the secular purpose requirement, it
seems that if a law has no secular legislative purpose or if it has some
secular purpose but its primary purpose is religious in nature, then
the law fails to meet this prong of the Lemon test. However, if the law
may have some religious purpose, but its primary purpose is secular,
then it will likely pass this prong. This distinction was clearly articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Wallace v. Jaffree when it stated, "For
even though a statute that is motivated in part by a religious purpose
39. Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable with Major General Douglas Stone,
supra note 2.
40. 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989).
41. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971).
42. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at
1159.
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may satisfy the first criterion [of the Lemon test],.... the First Amend-
ment requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely moti-
vated by a purpose to advance religion."43 Examining the factual
background of the cases where the Court found, or failed to find, a
secular purpose will help flesh out this distinction.
In Wallace v. Jaffree, the Supreme Court held that an Alabama
statute which authorized a moment of silence in public schools for
meditation or voluntary prayer violated the Establishment Clause. 44
In reaching its decision, the Court said that the statute's sole express
purpose was to return voluntary prayer into the schools and that there
was no secular purpose whatsoever behind the statute.4 5 To support
its finding that the sole purpose was a religious one, the Court delved
into the legislative history and extracted testimony from the statute's
sponsor which indicated that the goal of the bill was a religious one. 4 6
Because the Court could find no secular purpose, the statute failed the
first prong of the Lemon test. Likewise, in Stone v. Graham, the Court
invalidated a Kentucky law which mandated that a copy of the Ten
Commandments purchased with private money be displayed in every
public school classroom.47 The State argued that the statute's avowed
purpose was secular in nature and that the Kentucky legislature re-
quired that a notation of this purpose be printed at the bottom of each
copy of the Ten Commandments. 48 In small print, the notation read:
"The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in
its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and
the Common Law of the United States."49 The Court found such an
"avowed" secular purpose unpersuasive and ruled that merely having
an avowed secular purpose would not "avoid conflict with the First
Amendment."5 0 The Court stated that the "pre-eminent purpose for
posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly relig-
ious in nature. The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text
in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a
supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact."51 In other words,
the Court held that if a law's pre-eminent or primary purpose is relig-
ious and the supposed secular purpose for the statute appears to be
little more than makeup intended to help the law pass constitutional
muster, then the law will be deemed to have no secular purpose and
will fail the first prong of the Lemon test. As characterized in a con-
43. 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
44. Id. at 60-61.
45. Id. at 56.
46. Id. at 65 (Powell, J., concurring).
47. 449 U.S. 39, 39-41 (1980).
48. Id. at 41.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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curring opinion by Justice O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly, "The pur-
pose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion."52
The Court cemented this more exacting interpretation of the first
prong of the Lemon test in Edwards v. Aguillard and endorsed looking
beyond the stated purpose of the statute to the legislative history and
intent.53 Edwards dealt with a Louisiana statute that required public
schools teaching evolution to also teach creation science.54 As an
opening salvo into its examination of whether the Louisiana statute
had a secular purpose, the majority stated, "While the Court is nor-
mally deferential to a State's articulation of a secular purpose, it is
required that the statement of such purpose be sincere and not a
sham."55 The stated purpose of the act was to promote academic free-
dom. During trial, the State argued that "academic freedom," as used
by the state legislature, meant "teaching all of the evidence" about the
origins of humanity or, more broadly, meant fairness between differ-
ent views.56 In rejecting these as the real or sincere goals of the stat-
ute, the Court emphasized that the statute did not actually help
achieve those goals and reasoned that if a statute is not actually
geared toward achieving the stated purpose, then that stated purpose
must not be genuine. 5 7 Rather than enhancing academic freedom or
fairness, the law forced teachers and schools to teach creationism and
provided resources for creating "creationism" teaching guides and re-
source services for that curriculum-the law did not provide those re-
sources for evolution curriculum.58 Nor was the Court blind to the
historical context in which the evolution verses creationism debate
emerged when it relied, in part, on that history in reaching its deci-
sion. The Court stated, "There is a historic and contemporaneous link
between the teachings of certain religious denominations and the
teaching of evolution."59 Based on this history and the disconnect be-
tween the stated and actual purpose that was discovered after a close
examination of the law and its legislative history, the Court deter-
mined that the primary purpose was religious and as a result violated
the first prong of the Lemon test.6 0
52. 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 1159.
53. 482 U.S. 578, 586-87 (1987).
54. Id. at 580-82.
55. Id. at 586-87.
56. Id. at 586.
57. Id. at 588.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 590.
60. Id. at 594.
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This same exacting methodology was followed more recently by the
Court in McCreary County, KY v. ACLU of KY.61 In this 2005 deci-
sion, the Court once again examined the legislative history when it
evaluated the constitutionality of installing the Ten Commandments
in two county courthouses. 62 The counties claimed that the displays
were intended to provide civic education regarding one of our founding
legal codes. 6 3 Before the suit which reached the Supreme Court was
brought, the displays had been challenged twice before, and in re-
sponse, the counties twice installed other documents and historical ex-
planations-all of which, however, referenced only legal documents
with Judeo-Christian religious rhetoric.64 Based on this, the Supreme
Court confirmed that the real and authentic purpose behind the in-
stallation was religious, and that the installation was aimed at ad-
vancing a particular religion.65 Aside from affirming the importance
of scrutinizing the genuine purpose behind the law, the Court in Mc-
Creary also emphasized the importance of neutrality in the Establish-
ment Clause and the first prong of the Lemon test.6 6 Quoting
Epperson v. Arkansas67 and Everson v. Board of Education,68 the
Court emphasized that the "First Amendment mandates governmen-
tal neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion."69 The Court further stated that "[w]hen the government
acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing relig-
ion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of official re-
ligious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government's
ostensible object is to take sides."70 Indeed, as characterized by the
Supreme Court in Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, "Lemon's 'purpose' requirement aims at
preventing [government] from abandoning neutrality and acting with
the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious mat-
61. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
62. Id. at 861-64; see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 1203 (3d ed. 2006).
63. Id. at 851-55.
64. Id. at 853-55.
65. Id. at 884-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 860.
67. 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
68. 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
69. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860. See Shahin Rezai, Note, County of Allegheny v.
ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U.L. REV.
503 n.34 (1990) (discussing how "[a]dvocates of neutrality between denomina-
tions as well as between religion and nonreligion maintain that the drafters of
the first amendment fully realized the distinction between church and religion.
Hence, if their aim was limited to the prohibition of governmental discrimination
among religious beliefs, they would have constructed the Establishment Clause
to indicate that notion").
70. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860.
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ters."7 1 So, the Court in McCreary not only affirmed the importance of
the first prong of the Lemon test, but also emphasized that one of the
Establishment Clause's key objectives is to maintain government neu-
trality between religions and between religion and no religion. 72
Despite the Court's willingness to scrutinize whether the avowed
secular purpose is the actual purpose, and its requirement that the
primary purpose be a secular one, the Court does not seem to require
that the law be devoid of religious purpose or overtones. This is evi-
dent in the somewhat older case of McGowan v. Maryland.73 In Mc-
Gowan, petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Maryland laws
which required businesses to be closed on Sundays-laws known as
Sunday Blue Laws.74 The Court once again recognized the impor-
tance of looking back to the legislative and social history surrounding
the laws-and in this case went all the way back to the 13th century
in discussing the originally-religious purpose for Sunday Blue Laws.7 5
But while the Court noted the religious origins of these laws, it ulti-
mately upheld them because the present purpose for the laws was a
secular one-to provide a day of uniform rest for all citizens.7 6 The
Court held that "the fact that this day is Sunday, a day of particular
significance for the dominant Christian sects, does not bar the State
from achieving its secular goals."7 7 So in contrast to Edwards, Wal-
lace, and Stone, the McGowan Court chose to downplay the religious
origins of the laws because it seemed that the primary contemporary
purpose of each law was a secular one.
Where does the U.S. government's program of teaching a moderate
version of Islam to detainees fit in this rubric? There is a strong argu-
ment to be made on behalf of the government that the program has a
primary purpose which is secular. The goal-at least the stated
goal-is to win the hearts and minds of detainees and deradicalize
them towards the United States in order to enhance American na-
tional security. This is a secular purpose, and arguably a very compel-
ling one. The program, being both new and an executive action, does
not have the same kind of history-either social or legislative-to ex-
amine when deciding if the avowed purpose of helping in the war on
terror, is the true purpose or just a sham. It seems very unlikely, es-
pecially given our nation's relationship to Christianity (as demon-
strated by the litany of cases where state actors attempt to prop up
71. 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
72. Contrast this with the initial inquiry regarding the existence of "discrimination"
which, based on the case law, seems to be more focused on discrimination be-
tween religions.
73. 366 U.S. 420 (1961)
74. Id. at 422-23.
75. Id. at 431-32.
76. Id. at 445.
77. Id.
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Christianity) and the Bush Administration's strong ties to the Chris-
tian community, that the program is intended to promote Islam.
Thus, the program will not be unconstitutional in quite the same way
as the government actions in the above cases.
This does not mean, however, that the purpose behind the deradi-
calization program would pass the first prong of the Lemon test. The
emphasis of one version of Islam over another seems to clearly conflict
with the Court's recently renewed emphasis on neutrality in Mc-
Creary County, KY v. ACLU of KY, where the Court discussed at great
length the importance of neutrality when making a determination
under the first prong of Lemon. 7s Here, the program is far from neu-
tral and is specifically designed to promote one branch or sect of Islam
over another, eroding any claim that the government may have a secu-
lar purpose.
The Court's treatment of the Establishment Clause in public
schools and prison may be instructive. In Edwards v. Aguillard, the
Court emphasized the importance of keeping the public school system
free from the establishment of religion and indicated that the courts
should be especially cautious when monitoring religion in the
schools.79
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the
Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools. Families entrust
public schools with the education of their children, but condition their trust on
the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance
religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and
his or her family. Students in such institutions are impressionable and their
attendance is involuntary .... The State exerts great authority and coercive
power through mandatory attendance requirements, and because of the stu-
dents' emulation of teachers as role models and the children's susceptibility to
peer pressure. 8o
Perhaps in a detention center context and a foreign affairs context, the
Supreme Court would allow the government more leeway in the evalu-
ation of whether a secular purpose existed or not. Certainly courts
treat religion and the First Amendment differently in the domestic
prison system. For example, the Court upheld as constitutional the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
which allows restrictions on prisoner's First Amendment rights so
long as the restriction serves a compelling government interest and is
the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.S1
In Edwards, one of the rationales for being doubly confident that
public schools were not unduly promoting a particular religious view-
78. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
79. 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987).
80. Id.
81. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (upholding the constitutionality of
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000).
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point was the compulsory nature of the institution and that students
were a captive audience. Those same considerations would seem to
apply to the detention center context as well, as it involves an involun-
tary presence and a captive audience. That said, those considerations
also apply in the domestic prison setting and the courts have not used
the same level of vigilance in policing prisoner's first amendment
rights as they have public school students-on the contrary, prisoners
have been afforded less rights despite their captivity.8 2 This is not to
say that the Court has not afforded prisoners any religious rights. But
relative to the rights of students and those outside of prison, Congress
through RLUIPA83 and the Supreme Court in cases such as Cutter v.
Wilkinson,8 4 have recognized some of the exigencies placed on the gov-
ernment in running a prison system and permit the government to
restrict religious rights when a compelling interest is present. Those
same exigencies relating to prison security and order-and others re-
lated to foreign policy and national security-would be at play in the
foreign detention center context as well. However, a distinction can be
drawn between the domestic prison cases which usually restrict a
prisoner's ability to fully practice his or her religion and the religious
education programs in the detention centers in Iraq, where a particu-
lar set of beliefs is being promoted at the exclusion of others.
Given these examples, though the government is engaging very
overtly in the promulgation of a certain religion-hiring clerics, hav-
ing them teach detainees a certain color of Islam, and actually itself
engaging in religious interpretation-the government program may
still pass the first prong of the Lemon test because the reason for do-
ing this seems to be motivated by a secular, national security interest.
And it is that national security interest and the fact that the program
is taking place in a type of prison, as opposed to the schoolhouse,
which would provide additional reason and justification for a court to
find that the first prong of Lemon is satisfied. So, at least with respect
to the first prong of the Lemon test, the government has a colorable
claim that it passes constitutional muster-though it is far from clear.
However, if the neutrality aspect of the first Lemon prong continues to
hold force as it did in the 2005 McCreary decision, the government
program is likely to be found in violation of the Lemon secular purpose
prong because its purpose is to advance one religion over another, irre-
spective of what other secular purposes it may have. In any event,
even if a court finds that there is a secular purpose, the government
program must still pass the other two prongs of the Lemon test.
82. See Gia B. Lee, First Amendment Enforcement in Government Institutions and
Programs, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1691, 1700-08 (2009).
83. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-274, 42 USC. § 2000cc-1 et seq (2000).
84. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
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2. Does the Primary Effect Either Advance or Inhibit Religion?
In its second prong, the Lemon test mandates that the principal
effect of the law must be one the neither advances nor inhibits relig-
ion.8 5 This prong comes from a long line of jurisprudence predating
Lemon. In Board of Education v. Allen, which the Court cites in
Lemon, a New York law that required public school libraries to check
out books free of charge to students enrolled in public and parochial
schools was held to have a secular purpose that neither inhibited nor
advanced religion.86 In determining that there was a secular effect,
the Court looked back to the stated purpose of the statute-to provide
educational opportunities to all students-and said that plaintiffs
could point to nothing in the effect that was inconsistent with that
purpose.8 7 It also emphasized that the benefit the statute provided
went to parents and children-and not other parochial schools.88 The
Court conceded that perhaps the free book loans made it more likely
that a parent would send their child to a religious school, but that was
no more true than with the state-paid bus fares in Everson and did
"not alone demonstrate an unconstitutional degree of support for a re-
ligious institution."8 9
However, since Allen and Lemon, the Court has expressed some
willingness, albeit limited, to overturn cases based on their lack of sec-
ular effect. For example, in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., the
Court ruled that a Connecticut statute which precluded employers
from requiring employees to work on their Sabbath was an invalid ad-
vancement of religion. 9 O The Court characterized the effect of the law
as follows:
[The statute] imposes on employers and employees an absolute duty to con-
form their business practices to the particular religious practices of the em-
ployee by enforcing observance of the Sabbath the employee unilaterally
designates. The State thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns auto-
matically control over all secular interests at the workplace; the statute takes
no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or those of other
employees who do not observe a Sabbath. The employer and others must ad-
just their affairs to the command of the State whenever the statute is invoked
by an employee. 9 1
As a result, the Court held that the statute had more than "an inciden-
tal or remote effect of advancing religion,"9 2 but in fact had "a primary
effect [of] impermissibly advanc[ing] a particular religious practice." 93
85. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
86. 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968).
87. Id. at 243.
88. Id. at 243-44.
89. Id. at 244.
90. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
91. Id. at 709.
92. Id. at 710.
93. Id.
357
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Hence, the focus of the Court seemed to be not only on the fact that it
advanced religion by creating an unqualified right for a person with a
particular religious belief-advancing religion-but also on how that
right affected others-inhibiting their secular interests. Here, the law
advanced one's religious right to observe a Sabbath at the expense of
an employer's interest in running their business successfully and fel-
low employees' interest in not being unduly impacted by the absentee
coworker and the additional workload the Sabbath observer's absence
would create.
That said, the Court has not invalidated all laws that create ex-
emptions for religious organizations. 9 4 Of note is Corp. of Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Chris of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, in
which the Court upheld the constitutionality of a provision in Title VII
which exempted religious organizations from employment discrimina-
tion based on religion.9 5 The Court emphasized that this was differ-
ent than the situation in Thornton and that a "law is not
unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance relig-
ion, which is their very purpose. For a law to have forbidden 'effects'
under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itself has ad-
vanced religion through its own activities and influence."9 6 The Court
agreed that the plaintiffs choice of religion was infringed upon, but
highlighted that it was not being infringed upon by the state, but
rather by the Church, 9 7 as his discharge was not required by stat-
ute.98 This contrasts with Thornton, where, according to the Court,
the Connecticut statute required accommodation by the employer to
the employee's religious demands.9 9 The distinction is a fine one and,
as Erwin Chemerinsky notes, perhaps "difficult to defend because
both laws granted a preference for religion alone." 100 Nevertheless,
this is the state of the current law.
Applying the secular effect test to the government re-indoctrina-
tion program in Iraq and other detention centers would seem to indi-
cate that the program is invalid. Perhaps under Allen, there is an
argument to be made that because there is a secular purpose-of der-
adicalizing detainees and advancing America's interests in its "war on
terror"-then the effect of the statute is similarly secular insofar as it
makes detainees hate America less and not engage in acts of violence
toward American strategic interests. But the better and stronger ar-
gument would seem to be that under the Thornton and Amos-type
94. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 1161.
95. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
96. Id. at 337 (emphasis in original).
97. Id. at n.15.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 1162.
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analyses, the program is advancing a particular religious interest at
the sake of the detainees' secular interests, their own religious inter-
ests, or both. So, as in Thornton, the government is not making an
exception for a religion, but rather is sanctioning and requiring people
to be impacted by a particular religion. The detainees are seemingly
required, as a condition of release, to learn about a certain version of
Islam. This impedes their ability to be free from religion altogether,
or their ability to develop and practice their own religious beliefs. As a
consequence, the program has no secular effect, and even if it does
have some, the state program fails even under Amos because its effect
has "advanced religion through its own activities and influence."O1
Not discounting this more traditional approach to "secular effect"
analysis, which is still good law and valid, the Court has recently fo-
cused on whether the law or program in question is a symbolic en-
dorsement of religion.1O2 A prime example of where the Court upheld
a statute because it was not a symbolic endorsement of religion and,
as a result, did not advance a religious purpose, was in Board of Edu-
cation of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens.1o 3 In Mergens, the
Court held a school policy which allowed extracurricular student
groups, including religious groups, to use school facilities after school
had dismissed did not advance a religious effect and was in no way a
symbolic endorsement of those students' religious views.1O4 The Court
distinguished this scenario from ones where it invalidated the use of
state funds to help pay for parochial school teachers that were teach-
ing state required courses.1 05 It reasoned that "the risk of creating 'a
crucial symbolic link between government and religion, thereby enlist-
ing-at least in the eyes of impressionable youngsters-the powers of
government to the support of the religious denomination operating the
school"' was not present when the school is merely allowing religious
students to congregate in its facilities.10 6 The Court also took pains to
emphasize that high school students were capable of distinguishing
between an equal access policy and state sponsorship of a religion,10 7
and that because all school groups and religions could take advantage
of the policy, the school could not be seen as endorsing a particular
religion.108
Even under the symbolic endorsement test, the U.S. religious re-
indoctrination program fails the secular effect test. Unlike Mergens,
under the program the individuals in question are ostensibly required,
101. Amos, 483 U.S. at 337.
102. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 1161.
103. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 250.
106. Id. (quoting Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985)).
107. Id. at 250-51.
108. Id. at 252.
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or at least coerced, to be involved with the religious program. Moreo-
ver, again unlike Mergens, the state-funded staff members are not
prohibited from facilitating the religious program or endorsing it. In-
deed, the state officials and the hired clerics are actively promoting
the ideology and beliefs to the detainees. Of course, it seems ridicu-
lous to postulate that the U.S. government would ever symbolically
endorse Islam and, arguably, Muslim detainees would be well aware
of the government's intentions behind the program. But within the
detention center context, endorsement of Islam, or at least a type of it,
is precisely what is happening. Indeed, the endorsement is much
more than symbolic: it is actual and active, as the government's goal is
to affect these detainees' beliefs in such a way that they adopt a par-
ticular set of religious beliefs.
So, either under the symbolic endorsement veneer of the secular
effect test or under the more classic Thornton and Amos approach, the
re-indoctrination program in U.S. foreign detention centers fails the
second prong of the Lemon test because it advances a religious effect
at the expense of a secular one.
3. Does the Law Foster Excessive Government Entanglement
with Religion?
Finally, even if the law or government program in question passes
the first two prongs of the Lemon test, it will still be struck down as
unconstitutional if it causes excessive government entanglement with
religion. Again, the Lemon case involved a review of Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island statutes that authorized state funds to be paid to
parochial schools in order to offset the cost of teachers, textbooks, or
both, which were used for secular subjects.' 0 9 In invalidating the
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania laws and articulating the contours of
the "no entanglement" prong, the Court focused on how the religious
nature of the schools "led the legislature to provide for careful govern-
mental controls and surveillance by state authorities in order to en-
sure that state aid supports only secular education."11o But it was
this need for judicious monitoring in order to ensure that state funds
were not being used for a religious purpose that led to the excessive
government entanglement with religion. In other words, if the law
requires "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state sur-
veillance" to ensure that there is a clear separation of church and
state and no establishment of religion, then there is entanglement. 1 11
Entanglement gives the appearance of establishment, and because the
risk of the public perceiving establishment is too great, the law is un-
109. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
110. Id. at 616.
111. Id. at 619.
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constitutional.11 2 The Court said that the dangers to entanglement
with respect to monitoring teacher behavior were particularly acute
because:
[A] dedicated religious person, teaching in a school affiliated with his or her
faith and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably experience great dif-
ficulty in remaining religiously neutral. Doctrines and faith are not incul-
cated or advanced by neutrals. With the best of intentions such a teacher
would find it hard to make a total separation between secular teaching and
religious doctrine. 1 1 3
In short, when individuals are involved in an authoritative position
over others and are asked to separate out their religious role from
their secular role, such a task is immensely difficult if not impossible.
The Court echoed this reasoning in Committee for Public Educa-
tion and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.1 14 In that case, the Court held
that state education and tax laws which provided maintenance and
repair grants, tuition reimbursement grants, and income tax breaks to
parents sending their children private schools were invalid.115 The
Court overruled the grants and tax breaks based on the second prong
of Lemon, because they unconstitutionally advanced a religious pur-
pose. 1 16 As a result, the Court did not rule directly on the entangle-
ment issue. However, in compelling dicta, the Court made sure to
note (and affirm) the ruling in Lemon. It stated that
[T]he importance of the competing societal interests [of preventing Establish-
ment or religion] implicated here prompts us to make the further observation
that, apart from any specific entanglement of the State in particular religious
programs, assistance of the sort here involved carries grave potential for en-
tanglement in the broader sense of continuing political strife over aid to
religion.117
And so, it is not just actual entanglement of the government that vio-
lates the third Lemon prong. Any government program that carries
the "potential" for entanglement in the sense that it may cause politi-
cal acrimony and strife about whether the government is aiding relig-
ion impermissibly violates the third prong of Lemon.
In 1985, the Court affirmed this line of reasoning in Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. l 18 As noted above, Thornton dealt with a
Connecticut statute prohibiting employers from forcing employees to
work on their Sabbath.119 In addition to overturning the statute be-
cause it impermissibly advanced a religious effect, the Court also over-
ruled the part of the statute that required the State Mediation Board
112. Id.
113. Id. at 618-619.
114. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 794.
118. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
119. Id.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
to determine which religious activities could fairly be considered as
observances of Sabbath on the grounds that the statute was "exactly
the type of comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state sur-
veillance ... which creates excessive governmental entanglements be-
tween church and state." 120 Requiring the state to make judgments
about which religious observance is genuine enough to be considered a
Sabbath observance completely immerses the government into de-
bates over the nature of different religious practices.
Recently, it appears the Court may be moving towards abandoning
the entanglement prong of the Lemon test. In Mitchell v. Helms, a
case with no majority opinion, the Court held that the government
could give instructional tools and equipment to religious schools so
long as they were not utilized for religious purposes. 1 2 1 Four of the
justices-Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy-relying on the
Court's previous ruling in Agostini v. Felton,1 2 2 said that only the first
two prongs of the Lemon test were relevant today. 12 3 But so far, no
majority decision has advocated the complete abandonment of the en-
tanglement prong. Even these four justices have limited their holding
relating to the modification of the Lemon test to the context of provid-
ing state aid to parochial schools.124 And inAgostini, where there was
a five justice majority, it is far from clear that the decision, written by
Justice O'Connor, was intended to throw out the entanglement
prong.i 2 5 Instead, the decision seems to suggest that the mere pres-
ence of a public school employee at a private school, teaching special
education programs, was not enough to constitute a "symbolic link" or
entanglement.12 6 This is to say, the four justice plurality in Mitchell
seems to be overstating the extent to which Agostini really under-
mined the entanglement prong. As such, the entanglement prong is
still good law and needs to be evaluated, particularly outside of the
parochial school context. As one scholar described the current status
of the Lemon test, "Although the Lemon test has come under extensive
criticism by legal scholars and Justices of the Supreme Court, it re-
mains the lens through which domestic aid and programs regarding
religion are examined."1 27 Needless to say, even if the entanglement
prong is not "good law" it does not arise to the level of "bigotry" as the
plurality in Mitchell hyperbolically contends.128
120. Id. at 708 (quoting Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 464 A.2d 785, 349 (1983)).
121. 530 U.S. 793 (2000). See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 1162.
122. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
123. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829.
124. Id. at 807.
125. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222-24.
126. Id. at 224.
127. Jessica Powley Hayden, Note, Mullahs on a Bus: The Establishment Clause and
US Foreign Aid, 95. GEO. L.J. 171, 181-82 (2006).
128. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829.
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Given that the entanglement prong is still good law, especially
outside of the context of aid to parochial schools, is the Muslim re-
education program in U.S. detention centers unconstitutionally entan-
gling the government with religion? In short, yes. Given that military
personnel are involved in the education program, selecting clerics, and
helping design religious lessons, there is a clear indication and direct
involvement of the state in advancing the religion. What is more, even
if the U.S. military were merely allowing or hiring moderate Muslim
clerics to come in and teach the detainees, this would evidence entan-
glement because the government is paying these clerics, and even if
not, allowing only select clerics access to the detainees certainly leads
to the sort of symbolic endorsement of one religion. If all clerics and
religions were allowed access to the detainees, perhaps the govern-
ment would avoid entanglement because there would be equal access
and the public and detainees could discern that the U.S. government
was not endorsing a particular sect. But that is not even remotely the
case. Indeed, as Dr. Benard points out, it is the religious education
programs' association with the U.S. military that risks further alien-
ating detainees. 12 9
As the government re-education program also involves the U.S.
government deciding which branch of Islam is true or at least worthy
of teaching to the detainees and which ones are undesirable and "in-
authentic," then the program is strikingly similar to the judgment
calls that the State Mediation Board was required to make in Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.130 The Court struck down the mediation
board as an impermissible entanglement because it required the state
to judge which religious observances were authentic and warranted
protection under the Sabbath observance holiday.131 Here too, the
government is being asked to judge what interpretation of Islam is
acceptable, authentic, and should be taught to the detainees. As a re-
sult, the detention program is fairly analogous to the situation in
Thornton and should be struck down accordingly.
Further, given the emphasis of the Court in both Nyquist and
Lemon on the appearance of entanglement and the risk that there
may be political or social strife related to a program that may involve
the government with one religion over another, courts should be cau-
tious and only allow such programs when it is clear that no such strife
or conflict would be fair or forthcoming.
Finally, even if the entanglement prong is no longer good law or a
prong in its own right, the Agostini and Mitchell decisions do seem, at
the very least, to include it as a factor within the first two prongs, and
so this application and analysis is useful and still applicable in help-
129. Benard, supra note 16.
130. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
131. Id. at 708.
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ing to determine if there is a government purpose and if the program
is advancing a secular purpose.
Summarizing the analysis of the Muslim re-indoctrination pro-
grams as applied to the Lemon test, it seems that the government has
an arguable claim that it passes the first prong because it has a secu-
lar purpose even if it is not devoid of religious purpose. However, if
the neutrality aspect of the first prong is emphasized, the program is
likely to fail the secular purpose test because it is not neutral in which
religions it chooses to support. The programs seem to fairly clearly
fail the second prong of the Lemon test because they advance a relig-
ious effect and are a symbolic endorsement of a particular sect. As for
the entanglement prong, it is clear that the program excessively en-
tangles the government in religion-though the question remains as
to whether this prong of the Lemon test will remain good law for long.
C. Cases Decided Without Reference to the Lemon Test
Though the Lemon test for the Establishment Clause is extremely
important and has been relied on historically, several recent Supreme
Court cases have declined to apply it-even though other recent cases
have used the Lemon test13 2-as was evident in the 2005 McCreary
case. 13 3 As a result of the Lemon test's precarious future, it is neces-
sary to analyze these other cases and see what guidelines they provide
for the Establishment Clause.13 4 As will be made clear, cases apply-
ing alternative tests primarily focus on neutrality toward religion.
In Van Orden v. Perry, a case which dealt with whether the display
of a Ten Commandments monument on the Texas state house grounds
violated the Establishment Clause, the Court recognized that the
Lemon test had been used in many cases, but not all.135 In Van
Orden, the Court decided it was unnecessary to apply Lemon in the
situation where the Court was evaluating a passive monument, as op-
posed to a government program. 136 This may suggest that Lemon is
still appropriate in the context of active government programs such as
the Muslim re-education program in Iraq. However, given the chance
that a court may find Lemon inapplicable, it is worth examining the
standards, if any, the Court used in the Van Orden decision. The deci-
sion is relatively short and emphasizes the historical role that religion
has played in American history, particularly the Ten Commandments.
132. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 218, 232 (1997); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993); Sch. Dist. of City of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382-83 (1985); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 1159.
133. McCreary County, KY. v. ACLU of K.Y., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
134. In Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), the Supreme Court specifically declined
invitations to reconsider the Lemon test.
135. 545 U.S. 677, 685-86 (2005).
136. Id. at 686.
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The decision took note of the several other Ten Commandments hom-
ages in government buildings, including the Supreme Court.137 It
seemed to emphasize that when the religious iconography was serving
a historical purpose, it was permissible; but that when it was moti-
vated by a clearly religious purpose-as was the Kentucky statute ex-
amined in Stone v. Graham which mandated the posting of the Ten
Commandments in classrooms13S-then it was impermissible.139
Other than this emphasis on the distinction between the historical
and secular purpose of the monuments-as opposed to a clearly relig-
ious purpose-the decision does not offer much in the way of guide-
lines for deciding Establishment Clause cases. The purpose of the
Muslim re-education program has already been discussed and argua-
bly there is a secular, national security based interest for the program.
However, it also clearly advances religion and entangles the govern-
ment. Thus, it seems likely that outside of the passive monument sit-
uation, the Court would be a bit more exacting in its evaluation of
government's role with religion based both on its prior jurisprudence
using the Lemon test (which again has not been abandoned) and its
non-Lemon test cases.
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, decided in 2000,
the Court held that student-led prayer over the public address system
at the commencement of public high school football games violated the
Establishment Clause. 140 The case mentions the secular purpose
prong of Lemon, but somewhat in passing. The Court's decision fo-
cuses on whether the district's policy of providing for the election of a
student to give the prayer and then allowing the student to do so con-
stitutes an actual or perceived endorsement of religion. The Court
emphasized that even perceived endorsement of religion constitutes a
violation of the Establishment Clause and that even if no student ever
speaks and no one is compelled to listen before the football games, the
very policy and the act of electing a student to this post sends the
signal of endorsement. 14 1 Though not emphasizing Lemon, Santa Fe
does not diverge terribly from it, and Justice Steven's majority's em-
phasis on endorsement draws from the Court's secular effect jurispru-
dence under the second Lemon prong. As discussed above in relation
to symbolic endorsement under Lemon, the government re-indoctrina-
tion program has the effect of endorsing certain sects of Islam over
others, and both actively and symbolically endorses one religion over
others and over no religion at all. Because of this, it would likely fail
under the Santa Fe endorsement gloss.
137. Id. at 689-90.
138. 449 U.S. 39, 39-41 (1980).
139. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 688-91.
140. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
141. Id. at 306.
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As mentioned above, four of the justices in Mitchell v. Helms advo-
cated a modified version of Lemon with only the first two prongs of
purpose and effect. 142 Analyzing the government instructional aid to
parochial schools for whether it had a religious effect, the Thomas plu-
rality opinion focused on whether there was government indoctrina-
tion. On this question, the Mitchell decision like Santa Fe primarily
looked to neutrality. Justice Thomas wrote that:
In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to the State and
indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned to the principle of neu-
trality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons
without regard to their religion. If the religious, irreligious, and areligious are
all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoc-
trination that any particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of
the government.143
But in addition to the issue of neutrality, the Court said that the "sec-
ond primary criterion for determining the effect of governmental aid is
closely related to the first. The second criterion requires a court to
consider whether an aid program 'define [s] its recipients by reference
to religion."'144 In this case, even under the more narrow Mitchell
plurality decision, the detainee re-education program would violate
the secular effect test. As discussed above, the program is far from
neutral and only a certain type of Islam is singled out for government
promotion and assistance within the detention centers, while more
conservative elements of Islam are singled out for active elimination.
Moreover, as the government is selecting only certain clerics to preach
and teach, the government program "defines its recipients by refer-
ence to religion" and violates even Justice Thomas' characterization of
the Establishment Clause.
Finally, in Good News Club v. Milford Central School, the Court
does not even mention Lemon in deciding that a school would not vio-
late the Establishment Clause were it to allow a religious group to use
school facilities.14 5 In doing so, the Court continued the trend of em-
phasizing neutrality towards religion.1 4 6 The Court said that a "guar-
antee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government,
following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to
recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones,
are broad and diverse."147 The Court then went on to consider the
extent to which the community would feel pressure to participate in
the religious club's activities.148 Finally, the Court discussed the sig-
142. 530 U.S. 793, 807-08, (2000).
143. Id. at 809.
144. Id. at 813 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997)).
145. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
146. Id. at 114; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 1167.
147. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 98-145 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995)).
148. Id. at 115.
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nificance that the case dealt with public schools and captive chil-
dren. 14 9 In applying these three criterions, the Court said that not
allowing the club access would be partial, whereas allowing it access
along with the other organizations was neutral and prevented a viola-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause. 150 In discussing coercion, because
attending the after-school club required parental permission, the
Court examined any coercive effects on the parent, not the student,
and thus downplayed any significance and heightened scrutiny that
normally attends Establishment Clause analysis of practice within a
public school setting. So, once again, though this case does not explic-
itly fit into a rigid framework for evaluating Establishment Clause
cases, it does provide another piece of the fabric by adding continued
and enhanced validity to the focus on neutrality. Milford also empha-
sizes indoctrination and symbolic endorsement with its discussion of
coercion. Applying the government re-indoctrination program to
Milford's Establishment Clause regime once again would result in the
Muslim re-education program being struck down. It is far from neu-
tral and results in direct coercion and compulsion by requiring detain-
ees, as a condition of release, to listen to moderate clerics hired by the
U.S. government.
In sum, though the recent cases have not relied as explicitly on
Lemon and are perhaps slightly loosening the Establishment Clause
tests, they still provide for rigorous scrutiny into whether a govern-
ment program has the purpose or effect of advancing a religion over
others or none at all, with particular focus on whether the government
is violating its obligation to be neutral. As has been articulated, the
Muslim re-education program in foreign detention centers violates
this neutrality and as a consequence the Establishment Clause.
Now that it has been established that the government's Muslim re-
education program likely violates current Establishment Clause juris-
prudence, the question is whether the Establishment Clause applies
outside of the U.S. borders.
IV. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IS BOTH A
STRUCTURAL RESTRAINT AND A PROTECTION
OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
Whether the Establishment Clause is applicable outside of the
United States may depend on whether the clause is considered a
structural restraint on government or a protection of individual lib-
erty. Many have viewed the Establishment Clause and other provi-
sions of the Constitution in a rather narrow, less comprehensive light
and emphasized that the Establishment Clause is either a structural
149. Id.
150. Id. at 119.
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restraint or a protection of individual liberty. This Article contends
that that the Establishment Clause, like several other provisions of
the Constitution, is both-it restrains the government from impermis-
sibly promoting certain religions and, as a consequence, protects indi-
vidual liberty from the imposition or advancement of that religion.
There are many historical, legal, and logical arguments that support
this conception of the Establishment Clause. Viewing the Establish-
ment Clause as a restraint and a protection provides the most cohe-
sive and comprehensive interpretation of the clause, with the
additional benefit that it provides the most protection to individuals
and from the government. Emphasizing the dual role of the Establish-
ment Clause as a protection and restraint also helps coalesce and
make sense of precedents and history that only discuss one or the
other. Whether the Clause is viewed as a structural restraint or pro-
tection of individual liberty is important because it may affect how
and to what extent its protections apply extraterritorially. In either
case, this Article contends the detention centers fall within the Estab-
lishment Clause's reach. But by demonstrating that the Establish-
ment Clause is both a protection of liberty and restraint on
government, it strengthens the rationale for the Establishment
Clause's extraterritorial application and provides two legal justifica-
tions for its extension abroad.
A. The Establishment Clause is a Protection of Individual
Liberty
As scholar Jessica Hayden points out, "Today, the generally ac-
cepted view of the Establishment Clause is that it protects individual
liberties."151 Indeed, Professor Michael McConnell highlights that it
is precisely because of the limitation on government action in the
realm of religion that the free pursuit of religion in America has been
so historically vibrant. He notes that "established religion tended to
produce discord, conflicted with liberal principles, and weakened relig-
ion. [Alexis del Tocqueville, who described religion as 'the first' of
America's 'political institutions,' reported that religion was stronger in
America than in any other country, and attributed this strength to the
separation between church and state."15 2
This view of the Establishment Clause as a protection of individual
liberty is supported by a long line of Supreme Court jurisprudence. In
Everson v. Board of Education, the Court explicitly recognized that
the Establishment Clause operated as both a limitation on govern-
ment power and as a protection of individual liberty.15 3 The Court
151. Hayden, supra note 127, at 189.
152. Michael W. McConnell, Why is Religious Liberty the "First Freedom"?, 21 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1243, 1255 (2000).
153. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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emphasized that the Establishment Clause should be given "broad in-
terpretation" and emphasized the interrelation of protection of liberty
and restraint on government, stating that "[t]he structure of our gov-
ernment has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal
institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has se-
cured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority."154 The
Court continued by listing the different tasks that the Establishment
Clause performs:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to
remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or pro-
fessing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance. 1 5 5
Hence, the Establishment Clause limits the government's ability to
aid a religion or set one up. But it also protects individuals from pun-
ishment or from being forced to go to a particular church-it protects
their liberty. Further highlighting that the clause is both a protection
of liberty and a restraint, the Court said that "State power is no more
to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them."15 6 In
other words, the state cannot limit a person's or religion's ability to
operate and exist, nor can it favor one or another. It is both a limita-
tion on the government and a positive right for the individual.
The Everson decision's view of the Establishment Clause as a pro-
tection of individual liberty was followed in several subsequent deci-
sions. In School District of Abbington Township v. Schempp, the
Court quoted Everson with approval.157 The decision affirmed that
the "liberties" guaranteed by the Constitution included the First
Amendment's prohibition that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."155 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court, in finding that the pay-
ment of parochial school teachers led to impermissible entanglement,
emphasized the impact that this violation of the Establishment
Clause would have on impressionable young students and their liberty
interest in being free from government inculcation of religion.159
Moreover, in its closing salvo on the importance of avoiding govern-
ment entanglement and establishment with religion, the Court said,
"The Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for
154. Id. at 15.
155. Id. at 15-16.
156. Id. at 18.
157. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
158. Id. at 216.
159. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and
that while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines
must be drawn."16o The Court draws a fairly clear link between en-
tanglement/establishment and its relationship to individual choice or
liberty. In Engel v. Vitale, the Court once again recognized the inter-
play between the Establishment Clause and the protection of individ-
ual liberty. The Court stated that "one of the greatest dangers to the
freedom of the individual in his own way [lies] in the Government's
placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of
prayer or one particular form of religious services." 16 1
Again, in Aguilar v. Felton, the Court highlighted the link between
the Establishment Clause and the protection of individual liberty:16 2
The principle that the state should not become too closely entangled with the
church in the administration of assistance is rooted in two concerns. When
the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination in matters of religious
significance, the freedom of religious belief of those who are not adherents of
that denomination suffers, even when the governmental purpose underlying
the involvement is largely secular. In addition, the freedom of even the adher-
ents of the denomination is limited by the governmental intrusion into sacred
matters. "[T]he First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion
and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free
from the other within its respective sphere." 1 6 3
Notice that the two concerns that the Court gave as motivating the
Establishment Clause are that the adherents of the religion with
whom the government is dealing will be intruded upon, and that the
non-adherents also suffer because the government is supporting an-
other religion. It is worth noting that in his dissent, Chief Justice
Burger also seems to recognize the connection between the Establish-
ment Clause and the protection of individual liberty. His very objec-
tion to the majority opinion is that he does not believe that they have
shown how the program's entanglement with the government in-
fringes on liberty. 164 If they had, Chief Justice Burger implies he
would have decided differently.
Further evidence of how the Establishment Clause has been
viewed as an individual rights provision is that it has been applied to
the states under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
160. Id. at 625.
161. 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962).
162. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). But see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (overturning
Aguilar's holding but not changing or substantially commenting on the issue of
whether the Establishment Clause is a protection of individual liberty).
163. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409-10 (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333
U.S. 203, 212 (1948)).
164. Id. at 419-20 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Amendment-meaning that individual liberty is protected against
state establishment of religion.165
And even in the Court's most recent cases, written by some of the
more conservative justices, the Court has been very concerned about
indoctrination. In Good News Club v. Milford Central Schooll66 and
Mitchell v. Helms,16 7 both decided in the last nine years, the Court
said rather clearly that the Establishment Clause is designed to pre-
vent the government from unduly influencing and imposing religion
on individuals and that these individuals have the liberty to practice
how they wish, express that practice, and be free of government intru-
sion or coercion. 168
Several commentators have criticized an approach which treats
the Establishment Clause as a protection of individual liberty. Jessica
Hayden has blamed the Court's treatment of the clause as a protection
of liberty for the confusion that has surrounded how the Establish-
ment Clause should be applied.16 9 She believes that it has created an
"analytical dilemma" which serves as the main impetus for the recent
movement away from the Lemon test.17 0 Professor Carl Esbeck has
also criticized the Court's "reluctance to openly acknowledge that it
views the Establishment Clause as [a] structural [restraint]" for caus-
ing Establishment Clause doctrine to "appear muddled."171 However,
scholars like Hayden and Esbeck are probably less realistic than the
decisions may warrant. Certainly there has been much divergence in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. But the confusion and criticism
has less to do with a view of the Clause as a protection of individual
rights and more to do with an ideological shift in the Court's composi-
tion. As the appointees have become more ideologically conservative,
their decisions, such as Agostini and Van Orden, have tended to be
more tolerant of government involvement with, and support of, Judeo-
Christian religious activity. And one would expect this trend to con-
tinue under the Roberts Court.
Indeed, as even Hayden notes, the Rehnquist Court to a large ex-
tent embraced the individual rights conception of the Establishment
Clause adhered to by the Warren and Burger Courts, but is neverthe-
less responsible for the recent changes in Establishment Clause tests
165. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); see also, Hayden, supra
note 127, at 189-90.
166. 533 U.S. 98, 114 (2001).
167. 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000).
168. See supra, section III.C.
169. Jessica Powley Hayden, Note, The Ties That Bind: The Constitution, Structural
Restraints, and Government Action Overseas, 96 GEO. L.J. 237, 267-68 (2007);
Hayden, supra note 127, at 190-92.
170. Hayden, supra note 127, at 191.
171. Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Govern-
mental Power, 84 IowA L. REV. 1, 11 (1998).
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and jurisprudence.'7 2 The reason for the shift in jurisprudence seems
to have more correlation with the shift in ideology than it does in a
shift in whether the Establishment Clause is viewed as a protection of
liberty. Moreover, far from clarifying Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, a shift to an approach that viewed the Establishment Clause
only as a structural restraint would muddle the waters even more by
throwing into question the rationale and underpinnings of the last 70
years of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Rather, the way to pro-
vide clarity and consistency to this jurisprudence is to recognize its
dual foundations and motivations-that is, recognize that it works as
a protection of individual liberty and a restraint on government. By
recognizing these dual objectives, which find support in history, logic,
and case law, courts will be able to more accurately judge whether an
Establishment Clause violation is occurring by evaluating whether
the government is either infringing on liberty and/or acting outside of
its permissible bounds. Given the correlation between the two, most
violations will probably implicate both. This is to say, when the gov-
ernment is establishing a religion, it will most likely also be infringing
on individual liberty. That said, requiring violations of both should
not be and is not a requisite for finding a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause. But rather, by recognizing the interplay between the
two a more cohesive and comprehensive analytical framework will
help guide courts' decision making in the future and be more true to
the Court's jurisprudential history where it recognized the dual role of
the Establishment Clause in seminal cases such as Everson.
B. The Establishment Clause is also a Structural Restraint
on Government
In addition to operating as a protection of individual liberty, the
Establishment Clause also operates and has been viewed by commen-
tators and the courts as a structural restraint on Government. As dis-
cussed at the outset of the previous subsection, the Court recognized
the dual role of the Establishment Clause as both a protection of indi-
vidual liberty and a restraint on government action in cases such as
Everson.1 73 Many of the commentators who argue for structural re-
straint approach see it as competing with the individual liberty ap-
proach. This Article contends that far from having two competing
aspects, the Establishment Clause makes the most logical and legal
sense when viewed as both a restriction on government action and a
protection of individuals from that action. Indeed, as Professor Akhil
Reed Amar and Jessica Hayden emphasize, a holistic evaluation of the
Bill of Rights "reveals structural ideas tightly interconnected with lan-
172. Hayden, supra note 127, at 190-91.
173. See supra, section V.A.
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guage of rights."174 Read through this holistic and structural gloss, it
becomes more evident that the Establishment Clause was intended to
serve as a restraint and a protection of individual liberty.
In addition to Everson, several other cases recognize the impor-
tance of the Establishment Clause as a restraint on government. In
Lee v. Weisman, the Court said, "It is beyond dispute that, at a mini-
mum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise."'17 5 The
Court clearly indicated that one of the prime characteristics of the Es-
tablishment Clause is that it prevents the government from coercing
individuals regarding religion. Most recently, in Pleasant Grove City
v. Summum, the Supreme Court held that a city's decision regarding
what kind of monuments would be placed in parks is government
speech, as opposed to private speech, and is therefore not governed by
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.176 In so deciding,
the Court noted, "This does not mean that there are no restraints on
government speech. For example, government speech must comport
with the Establishment Clause."' 77 This language by Justice Alito
clearly indicates that the Establishment Clause is a restraint on gov-
ernment-indeed, it is the example chosen by the Court to illustrate
that restraints exist. Moreover, Justice Potter Stewart, dissenting in
School District of Abington v. Schempp, strongly argued that the Es-
tablishment Clause operated as a restraint on the newly created na-
tional government and that it was designed to prevent the creation of
a national church and prevent interference with the states' existing
religious orientations.178 Justice Thomas carries Justice Stewart's
federalist torch today, and in his concurrence in Elk Grove Unified
School District v. Newdow, argued that it was a federalist provision
and a restraint on national government action. 17 9
Without question, Stewart did not and Thomas does not view the
clause as operating as both a restraint on government and a protec-
tion of individual liberty. But the majority decision in Schempp does
not deny that the Establishment Clause was a restraint on national
government or that it may have had a federalist aspect to it. Rather
the majority also recognized the individual rights aspect of the clause.
Indeed, in Schempp the majority discussed restraining or limiting the
government's ability to become proximate with religious activity.l8 0
174. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1132 (1991); Hayden, supra note 127, at 194.
175. 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
176. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
177. Id. at 1131-32.
178. 374 U.S. 203, 309-10 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See Hayden, supra note
127, at 195.
179. 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
180. 374 U.S. at 263.
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This is particularly evident when the Court distinguished between its
decisions in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v Board of Educationlsl and Zo-
rach v. Clauson.i8 2 Both cases involved a certain amount of govern-
ment involvement with sectarian schools. But the Schempp Court
reiterated that the program involved in McCollum was unconstitu-
tional because it lent "to the support of sectarian instruction all the
authority of the governmentally operated public school system" by
placing the religious instructor in the public school classroom.1 8 3 The
language of the Court and the distinction the majority draws empha-
sizes that the problem with the McCollum program was that the state
was exceeding its structural restraints by giving its authority and
prestige to a certain religious agenda. 18 4
In Elk Grove, the majority did not reach a decision on the merits
but instead dismissed the case for lack of prudential standing.1 8 5 But
Justice O'Connor's concurrence on the merits recognized not only the
individual protection aspect of the Establishment Clause, but also its
structural elements. O'Connor reviewed the issue of whether the
pledge of allegiance is a violation of the Establishment Clause through
what she calls the endorsement test. Justice O'Connor argued that
the endorsement test "captures the essential command of the Estab-
lishment Clause, namely, that the government must not make a per-
son's religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the political
community by conveying a message 'that religion or a particular relig-
ious belief is favored or preferred."' 18 6 She was concerned about an
individual's liberty and place in the community. But that concern was
routed through and safeguarded by focusing on the government's limi-
tations-what the government "must not" do. This view of the Estab-
lishment Clause as a restraint is slightly different than Justice
Thomas' more federalism-focused view of the Establishment Clause as
a restraint. But though they may differ in their beliefs regarding how
the Establishment Clause restrains government with respect to its ex-
traterritorial effect, it is enough to show that there is solid judicial
support for viewing the clause as a restraint.
Evidence that the Establishment Clause operates as a structural
restraint can also be gleaned from some of the unique rules the Court
has created for the Establishment Clause in comparison to its more
straight-forward individual rights clause cousins. Normally, when
seeking redress for a violation of an individual right, a plaintiff must
181. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
182. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
183. 374 U.S. at 263.
184. Id.
185. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
186. Id. at 34 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
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show a personal harm in order to have standing.18 7 Not so with Es-
tablishment Clause cases, which can be brought on a taxpayer basis-
the idea being that all citizens and taxpayers are harmed when the
government exceeds its restraints and uses the people's money for un-
authorized activity such as funding parochial schools.1SS Addition-
ally, when the courts hand down awards for violations of individual
rights, the award is usually designed to redress harm to the particular
plaintiff.18 9 But in Establishment Clause cases the remedies are often
class-wide and come in the form of injunctions on certain state actions.
As Hayden explains, "Remedies such as injunctions are typical of
cases in which the government has exceeded its power, not when it
has harmed an individual right."190 Examples are plentiful but in-
clude where the Court recommended that the district court enjoin the
states from making grants to the parochial schools for teacher sala-
ries,191 where the Court enjoined school prayer at high school gradua-
tions,19 2 where the Court enjoined prayer before high school football
games, 1 93 and where the Court enjoined the states from having
mandatory Bible reading before each school day.194
V. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE APPLIES
EXTRATERRITORIALLY
Now that the historical, legal, and logical arguments for why the
Establishment Clause should be viewed as both a structural restraint
on government power and a protection of individual liberty, rather
than one or another, have been articulated, it is necessary to demon-
strate why under either theory, the Establishment Clause, in the con-
text of detainee re-indoctrination programs, applies abroad. Even if
one is not convinced that the Establishment Clause is both a struc-
tural restraint and a protection of individual liberty, the Establish-
ment Clause still applies to and regulates the programs in question.
187. See generally Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (outlining the standing re-
quirement of "injury in fact").
188. See PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 381 (5th ed. 2004) (explaining the role of taxpayer or
citizen standing).
189. Hayden, supra note 127, at 196.
190. Id.
191. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 661 (1971).
192. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
193. Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000).
194. School Dist. of Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
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A. As a Structural Restraint, the Establishment Clause
Applies Abroad
If the Establishment Clause is viewed as a structural restraint on
government, then it applies extraterritorially. Jessica Hayden de-
scribes the role of structural restraints succinctly: "Structural re-
straints limit how the government can act, regardless of place or time
. . . the purpose of a structural clause is to manage government
power."19 5 However, although that general statement regarding
structural restraints may be true, the specific question of whether the
Establishment Clause as a structural restraint applies regardless of
time or place has not been specifically answered by the Supreme
Court.
There is some lower court judicial precedent supporting the idea
that the Establishment Clause as structural restraint applies abroad.
In Lamont v. Woods, the Second Circuit ruled that the Establishment
Clause did apply to a USAID program that provided public funds for
the construction, maintenance and operations of Jewish and Catholic
schools in foreign countries. 19 6 In so doing, the Second Circuit used
the steps outlined by the Supreme Court in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, a case which dealt with the extraterritorial application of
the Fourth Amendment. 197 There, the Supreme Court emphasized
that when determining whether constitutional provisions apply to ex-
traterritorial government action, three factors should be consid-
ered.198 These three factors were distilled by the Lamont decision and
include: "(1) the operation and text of the constitutional provision; (2)
history; and (3) the likely consequences if the provision is construed to
restrict the government's extraterritorial activities [i.e. the practical
consequences] ."199
In Lamont, the Second Circuit noted that the Establishment
Clause "imposes a restriction on Congress," and as a consequence is
different from provisions which solely give rights to the people. 20 0
This distinction was important to the Second Circuit's ultimate con-
clusion that the Establishment Clause applies abroad because the
Vergudo Court relied on the fact that the Fourth Amendment was a
protection of individual liberty to limit its extraterritorial application
to citizens and resident aliens.201
The Second Circuit also granted plaintiffs taxpayer standing, indi-
cating that everyone has a stake in the outcome because it is an issue
195. Hayden, supra note 127, at 189.
196. 948 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1991). See Hayden, supra note 127, at 198-99.
197. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
198. Id. at 274.
199. 948 F.2d at 834.
200. Id. at 835.
201. 494 U.S. at 266.
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of structural restraint.20 2 This fact played heavily into the court's de-
cision. It stated that "where the expenditure of federal tax money is
concerned, there can be no distinction between foreign religious insti-
tutions and domestic institutions."203 Relying on history to buttress
its operational arguments, the Second Circuit highlighted that while
drafting the First Amendment, the Framer's were acutely concerned
about the use of taxpayer money to advance a particular religion. 204
The Second Circuit also looked to Supreme Court precedent sug-
gesting that provisions of the Constitution acting as structural re-
straints have extraterritorial affect.20 5 In Downes v. Bidwell, the
Supreme Court ruled that the Uniform Duties Clause of the Constitu-
tion did not have application outside of the United States, but indi-
cated that there was a "clear distinction between those prohibitions
that go to the very root of the power of Congress to act at all, irrespec-
tive of time or place, and those that as are operative only 'throughout
the United States' or among the several states."20 6 The Supreme
Court in Downes even intimated that the Establishment Clause was
one of the provisions of the Constitution that knew no territorial
bounds:
When the Constitution declares "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall
be passed," and that "no title of nobility shall be granted by the United
States," it goes to the competency of Congress to pass a bill of that description.
Perhaps, the same remark may apply to the First Amendment, that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... -207
This is powerful language from the Supreme Court and is probably the
best indication from them that we have regarding the applicability of
the Establishment Clause overseas. As a result of Downes and the
operational and historical arguments outlined above, the Second Cir-
cuit determined that the Establishment Clause did apply extraterrito-
rially and limited the government's ability to fund these religious
schools.
The Supreme Court case of Reid v. Covert dealt with a situation
where individual rights provisions of the Constitution (the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments) were being applied extraterritorially.208 But the
plurality decision by Justice Black seemed to indicate an approach
whereby every provision of the Constitution was applicable and ger-
mane to government action abroad.20 9 As Hayden characterized the
decision, Justice Black "focused not on who was being harmed, but on
202. Lamont, 948 F.2d at 837.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 835.
206. 182 U.S. 244, 277 (1901).
207. Id.
208. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
209. Id. at 5-6.
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the actor-the government."2 10 Indeed, Black said that the United
States government was a "creature of the Constitution" and that the
government-even when acting abroad-can act only "in accordance
with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution."211 No doubt it
would seem perverse if a national government would have more au-
thority over its own citizens or anyone else outside of its country than
it would inside of its country. And so it is fitting that as a restraint on
government, the Establishment Clause limits government abroad just
as it would at home.
B. As a Protection of Individual Liberty, the Establishment
Clause Applies Abroad
If the Establishment Clause is viewed as only a protection of indi-
vidual liberty, then its extraterritorial application is not as broad or as
general as it would be if it is viewed as a structural restraint on gov-
ernment. As the Supreme Court ruled in Vergudo, constitutional pro-
tections for individual rights protect American citizens irrespective of
their physical location and protect aliens so long as they are within
the territory of the United States.2 12 This analysis has been followed
more recently in Reid v. Covert.213 Again, Reid focused on whether
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments should be extended to a U.S. citizen
abroad. Specifically, the case centered around whether a civilian who
had allegedly killed her husband on a U.S. air base in England was
entitled to a jury trial as opposed to a court martial.2 14 The Supreme
Court determined that she was entitled to a civilian jury trial and that
her constitutional protections extended beyond the borders of the
United States.215 At the outset of the plurality opinion, Justice Black
stated that "we reject the idea that when the United States acts
against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights."216
Of course, this does not mean that individual rights provisions of
the Constitution would apply abroad if a non-citizen were involved.
Certainly in the context of detention centers in Iraq, the detainees are
non-citizens. However, recently the courts have shown a willingness
to deem overseas detention centers controlled by the United States as
within the territory of the U.S. for purposes of extending individual
rights protections to alien detainees. In his concurrence in Rasul v.
Bush, Justice Kennedy indicated that federal courts could exercise ju-
risdiction over the detainees in Guantanamo and, hence, that they
210. Hayden, supra note 127, at 186.
211. Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6.
212. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
213. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
214. Id. at 3.
215. Id. at 18-19.
216. Id. at 5-6.
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could file habeas petitions, because of the "unchallenged and indefi-
nite control that the United States has long exercised over Guanta-
namo Bay. From a practical perspective, the indefinite lease of
Guantanamo Bay has produced a place that belongs to the United
States, extending the 'implied protection' of the United States to it."217
In In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, the D.C. District Court ruled
that because Guantanamo Bay is controlled entirely by the U.S.
Marines and the U.S. exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the base
through a treaty with Cuba, the Constitution extended protections to
the enemy combatants held there.2 18 In Boumediene v. United States,
decided in June of 2008, the Supreme Court affirmed this analysis and
held that constitutional habeas corpus extended to non-citizens held
at Guantanamo Bay.2 19 The Court did so, in part, because while de
jure sovereignty may lie with the Cuban government, de facto sover-
eignty of the base lies solely with the U.S. government. The Court
concluded that "questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective fac-
tors and practical concerns, not formalism."2 20 As a result, the fact
that the U.S. maintained effective control over Guantanamo was more
important to the question of whether the Constitution applied there
than the fact that the land was leased from Cuba. In other words,
"[olur basic charter cannot be contracted away like this," so the Con-
stitution's protections extended to the detainees at Guantanamo. 22 1
Whether the Guantanamo Detainee Cases and Boumediene deci-
sions should be characterized as applying the Constitution extraterri-
torially to non-citizens in detention centers or as merely an extension
of what constitutes "within the United States" is somewhat of a se-
mantic difference. The bottom line is the same regardless of the char-
acterization: individual liberty protections seem to apply to detainees
in U.S. controlled foreign detention facilities. Many would argue that
there is a difference between Guantanamo Bay and detention centers
in fields of combat. But the situation in Iraq is not a typical field of
combat situation. Indeed, the United States is for all intensive pur-
poses still an occupier and governed by the Hague Convention on Oc-
cupation-at least to some degree.2 22 Both the Supreme Court and
217. 542 U.S. 466, 487 (2004).
218. 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 464 (D.D.C. 2005).
219. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
220. Id. at 2258.
221. Id. at 2259.
222. "Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of
the hostile army. The occupation extends . . . where such authority has been
established and can be exercised." Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, adopted Oct. 18, 1907, available at http://www.
unhcr.org/refworld/docidl4374cae64.html. The United States authority and con-
trol in Iraq, even now that a government has been established, still seems to meet
this definition.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the D.C. District Court based their decisions to extend habeas rights
to the detainees, in part, on the permanent nature of Guantanamo
Bay and its longevity as a U.S. naval base. Using that criterion, the
detention centers in Baghdad seem very similar. Granted, the U.S.
military is slowly handing over control of the detention centers to the
Iraqi government and releasing detainees. But as made evident by the
military's pronouncements, these are no temporary combat prisons; in
fact, the U.S. recently invested $250 million into the construction of
three new detention centers. 22 3 There is no question that the U.S.
presence in Iraq has been and will continue to be long and far reach-
ing. As one-time Presidential hopeful Senator John McCain opined,
the United States could be there as long as 100 years. 22 4 Moreover,
Guantanamo is really little more than a navy base. In Iraq, the U.S.
government has several bases, not to mention being heavily involved
in the reconstruction and provisional governance of the country. This
is to say, although the U.S. may not be sovereign in Iraq, it does exer-
cise tremendous control there. While Iraq as a whole could probably
not be considered a U.S. territory, certainly the U.S. installations that
are fairly permanent would seem to be. Surely the detention centers,
which have been in operation for a full six years since the end of com-
bat operations, are reasonably permanent in nature, and thus could be
considered to be U.S. controlled territory. As such, the detainees there
have a right to the same constitutional protections as the detainees in
Guantanamo. The similarity between the two situations is enhanced
when one considers that the detainees in both places receive the same
classification-as enemy combatants-and are not being treated as
criminals or prisoners of war.2 2 5 Indeed, in the D.C. District Court
decision In re Guantanamo Detainees, another one of the factors that
led the court to protect the detainees was that they were classified as
enemy combatants and had never been charged with a crime-just
like many of the detainees in Iraq. Moreover, it would make little
sense to give an Iraqi who was transported to Guantanamo different
rights than an Iraqi held by the U.S. in Iraq. The Supreme Court has
recently warned the U.S. government not to attempt to restrict indi-
vidual rights and access to the courts by moving prisoners from one
location to another within the United States.226 The same rational
would apply to the situation of moving detainees to Guantanamo or
Iraq in order to limit or expand their rights.
223. See Robertson, supra note 15.
224. McCain Defends "100 Years in Iraq" Statement, CNN, Feb. 15, 2008, http://www.
cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/02/14/mccain.king/ (last visited April 30, 2008).
225. Mark Kukis, Are Iraq's Detainees Treated Fairly?, TIME, Nov. 12, 2007, http:l
www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1682972,00.html
226. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006).
[Vol. 88:341
20091 HOUSE OF WISDOM OR A HOUSE OF CARDS?
Moreover, as the In re Guantanamo Detainees decision makes
clear, especially when providing detainees rights represents no signifi-
cant hardship to the government, then there is reason to apply the
Constitution to the detainees even if they are in a location of ambigu-
ous denomination.227 The Court in Boumediene also emphasized
practical considerations as a factor in deciding on whether a right ex-
tends extraterritorially.228 Here, providing detainees with the right
to be free from religious indoctrination would not provide significant
hardship on the U.S. government. There are other, arguably more ef-
fective, means by which to achieve their objective.
The proposition that detainees in U.S. detention centers abroad
have access to the Constitution was similarly affirmed in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld.229 Though not as explicit or far-reaching as Boumediene,
the Hamdan Court implicitly recognized the right of detainees to ac-
cess the Constitution by granting the petitioner's writ of habeas
corpus.2 30 That the detainees could access rights contained under
American domestic law was also evident by the Court's determination
that the President's use of military commissions to try Guantanamo
detainees was a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
that the Executive Branch lacked the Constitutional authority to set
up military commissions to try captives taken in the "war on terror,"
as this authority lay with Congress. 2 31 As the petitioners in
Boumediene v. Bush contended, "[ilmplicit in [the Hamdan decision]
was the principle that a Guantanamo detainee can invoke constitu-
tional restraints-in that case separation of powers-to contest gov-
ernment action."2 32 And though Hamdan buttresses detainees' claims
to protection based on the Constitution as a restraint, implicit in any
case dealing with separation of powers and access to process is the
protection of individual rights and an individual's ability to, in the
case of due process, have his or her cause heard, and in the case of
separation of powers, prevent tyranny of one branch over another and
over the people. The Boumediene decision supports this analysis and
elucidates how structural restraints and protections of liberty go hand
in hand, declaring "that pendular swings to and away from individual
liberty were endemic to undivided, uncontrolled power."233
Additional legal support for the extraterritorial application of the
Establishment Clause based on its protection of individual liberties
227. 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 463 (D.D.C. 2005).
228. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
229. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
230. Id. at 567.
231. Id.
232. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23-25, Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078
(2007).
233. 128 S. Ct. at 2246.
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comes from Lamont v. Woods.234 As discussed above, to a large extent
the Second Circuit focused on the Establishment Clause's structural
restraints as a justification for its overseas application. 2 35 But the de-
cision also indicated that the clause's protection of liberty was an addi-
tional justification for its extraterritorial application.2 3 6 The Second
Circuit quoted the Supreme Court's decision in Flast v. Cohen where
the Supreme Court recounted that:
Our history vividly illustrates that one of the specific evils feared by those who
drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption was that the
taxing and spending power would be used to favor one religion over another or
to support religion in general .... The concern of Madison and his supporters
was quite clearly that religious liberty ultimately would be the victim if gov-
ernment could employ its taxing and spending powers [in this manner] .237
The emphasis of the Supreme Court here, the Second Circuit in La-
mont, and the Framer's in drafting the Establishment Clause was on
how the government's establishment of a religion may affect individ-
ual religious liberty. Professor Jesse Choper echoes this reading of the
Framer's motivation for the Establishment Clause. He instructs, "The
practice perceived by the Framers as perhaps the most serious in-
fringement of religious liberty sought to be corrected by the Establish-
ment Clause was forcing the people to support religion by the use of
compulsory taxes for purely sectarian purposes."238
The Second Circuit in Lamont also justified its application of the
Establishment Clause to the UNAIDS program because of the tax-
payer's interest in not having their money used to advance religions
that would benefit within the United States from the support that
they received outside of the U.S.239 And though its debatable whether
Islam's spread in the U.S. would be benefited by the U.S. detention
center program which preaches a moderate version of Islam, Ameri-
cans ostensibly have the same interest in not seeing the global Muslim
religion expanded by the state as they do in not having the Catholic
and Jewish faiths expanded by the state.
As a result, detainees in foreign detention centers are entitled to
some constitutional liberty protections and insofar as the detention
centers in Iraq resemble Guantanamo Bay, the Establishment Clause
as a protection of liberty should extend to them. But if it is deter-
mined that the Establishment Clause is not interpreted as a protec-
tion of liberty or that even if it is, it should not extend to detainees in
Iraq, the Establishment Clause is a structural restraint on govern-
234. 948 F.2d 825 (1991).
235. See supra, section V.A.
236. Lamont, 948 F.2d at 837.
237. 397 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968).
238. Jesse Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Con-
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ment and restrains the U.S. government regardless of where it is act-
ing. And so, in either case, the Establishment Clause would cover and
apply to the detention centers in Iraq. As a consequence, the Muslim
re-indoctrination program should be ruled unconstitutional because,
as demonstrated in Part III, it violates the Establishment Clause.
VI. EVEN WITH A FOREIGN POLICY MODIFICATION TO
THE DOMESTIC ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TEST,
MUSLIM RE-INDOCTRINATION VIOLATES THE
EXTRATERRITORIALLY-APPLIED
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Once it is determined that the Establishment Clause applies to the
detention centers and detainees and that the program would violate
the domestic Establishment Clause jurisprudence, one possible issue
that must be considered is whether a Court would or should modify
the test for a situation implicating national security.
In Lamont v. Woods, the Second Circuit implied one such modifica-
tion and considered the potential foreign political ramifications of rul-
ing the aid program unconstitutional.240 However, the court
discussed at length the ability and, indeed, the responsibility of courts
to judiciously monitor the political branches for compliance with the
Constitution and to not relinquish that duty at the first sign of foreign
political fervor. 241 The court stated:
While it is true that the conduct of foreign relations is constitutionally com-
mitted to the political branches, "it is error to suppose that every case or con-
troversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." The
power of the President and Congress to conduct foreign relations does not give
them carte blanche to transgress well-established constitutional boundaries,
and the Judiciary "cannot shirk [its constitutional] responsibilities merely be-
cause [a] decision may have significant political overtones." 2 4
2
The importance of judicial commitment to upholding the Constitution
in the face of potential political or international fallout was also ar-
ticulated by Justice Black in Reid v. Covert. He stated, "The concept
that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against ar-
bitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or
when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and
if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitu-
tion and undermine our basis of our government."24 3 And so, if a bal-
ancing test is employed that, once a violation of the Establishment
Clause is demonstrated, the government can be excused if it demon-
strates something less than strict scrutiny, the courts must not and
240. Id. at 840.
241. Id. at 831-32.
242. Id. (citations omitted).
243. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957).
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cannot rollover at the first sign of consequences for the political
branches.
Indeed, as the court suggests in Lamont, courts should also be
careful to distinguish questions of policy from questions of implemen-
tation. 24 4 So, if the government policy is aimed towards de-radicaliz-
ing detainees, that is a policy which is outside of the Court's purview.
But the courts can apply constitutional standards and limits to the
implementation of that policy. No doubt, the examination into
whether the law or program is narrowly tailored will involve just that
type of scrutiny.
With respect to the Muslim re-indoctrination program, it is likely
that the government can formulate some sort of government interest
in de-radicalizing the detainee population. But courts should be ex-
acting when evaluating whether a policy is narrowly tailored and
whether its implementation is constitutional. In this case, the law is
not narrowly tailored to the objective. Indeed, as the RAND Corpora-
tion suggests and as some of the military's other education efforts
evince,2 4 5 there are other, arguably much more effective, ways of
achieving that compelling government interest or balancing test that
do not violate the Establishment Clause. Thus, even if a compelling
interest or balancing test "out" is formulated for extraterritorial Es-
tablishment Clause cases, the Muslim re-education programs cur-
rently being operated in Iraq would still fall short of constitutional
muster.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Muslim re-indoctrination programs used in detention centers
in Iraq violate the current domestic tests regulating government es-
tablishment of religion. The Establishment Clause applies extraterri-
torially to these detention centers and the detainees in them because
it operates as both a structural restraint and a protection of liberty.
Structural restraints are in effect regardless of where the U.S. govern-
ment acts. Protections of individual liberty protect non-citizens when
they are in the states or in areas which are sufficiently controlled by
the U.S. to be deemed U.S. territory. Even if an altered version of the
Establishment Clause test is adopted that allows for government vio-
lation of the clause in the case of a compelling interest, here, the pro-
grams would fail that test because they are not narrowly tailored. As
a result, these programs should be declared unconstitutional, re-
vamped, and the House of Wisdom should be shown for what it really
is-a House of Cards.
244. 948 F.2d at 833.
245. See supra, Part II.
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